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Abstract
Heroes are not born; they’re made. This article examines the commonalities in the
backgrounds of people who take heroic action on behalf of others to theorize the
ways in which our society can encourage citizens to prepare themselves to act heroically. In looking closely at a variety of people who have acted heroically, in a single moment or over time, we argue they have at least four crucial commonalities:
They imagined situations where help was needed and considered how they would
act; they had an expansive sense of empathy, not simply with those who might be
considered “like them” but also those who might be thought of as “other” in some
decisive respect; they regularly took action to help people, often in small ways; and
they had some experience or skill that made them confident about undertaking the
heroic action in question.
Keywords: hero, heroism, empathy, altruism, heroic imagination, development

Every year in New York City, dozens of people die after falling from subway platforms and being struck by oncoming trains. Indeed, in 2013, 151
commuters were hit by trains (Donohue, 2013). On nearly every occasion,
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dozens of people stood by, each of whom likely would have said beforehand that they would definitely step up to help someone in desperate need
of assistance. Most people like to think of themselves as helpers. Ask anyone about a commuter falling on the tracks, a drowning child, or a woman
whose purse has been snatched, and the certainty of heroic action is virtually assured.1 As such, if asked, these subway commuters might have said
they could see themselves doing something heroic in this situation: calling
911, organizing a rescue effort that involves the group of onlookers, providing some sort of medical assistance after the fallen man has been hauled
back onto the platform, or even jumping down to lift the man up onto the
platform before the train arrives. But, importantly, they were not asked and,
at least in part, we contend that is one reason they mostly do not take action. While we undoubtedly want to think of ourselves as the sort of people
who would rush to assist someone in need, it is far more likely that most of
us would be among the throng that is standing by, watching the events unfold. Indeed, studies of the failure to act in situations of precisely this sort
have grown in number, with the result that the Bystander Effect, or diffusion of responsibility is a fairly well established principle in the field of psychology (see, e.g., Darley & Latane, 1968; Fischer et al., 2011).
And yet, every year, there are also reports of subway heroes. They step
out of the crowd and attempt to assist the person who has stumbled and
fallen into harm’s way; they do what we all take to be the right thing, despite the obvious risk. Society tends to briefly lionize these heroes without
learning much about them. Most of them simply walk away after their heroics, uninterested in any media coverage or reward, and most of them are
never heard from again after taking heroic action.
It turns out to be very difficult for most people to do the right thing when
the stakes are high. This is not to say that people are uncertain about what
it would mean to do the right thing in any given situation. The real reason
that most people are bystanders rather than heroes is that most people are
out of practice.
Clear, commonly used, and relatively well-studied examples of heroism
are the so-called Righteous Gentiles of the Holocaust, rescuers who risked
life and social standing to help Jews evade or escape from the Nazi machinery of death. The risk undertaken by these individuals was extreme and often required them to consciously choose to put themselves and their families in danger over and over again, often for a period of several years. But
heroic action can also be a one-time decision, undertaken seemingly without a great deal of planning or decision-making time, as the case of the subway rescuer or the civilian who rescues another person from a fire aptly
demonstrated. And while heroism is often associated in the popular imagination with physical risk, we also posit that the whistle-blowing employee
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who reveals unethical or illegal activities in their workplace—risking their
job, income, and social standing—is a hero (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011;
Franco & Zimbardo, 2006; Zimbardo, 2007). Although anyone can be a hero,
individuals who take heroic action are rare (Franco & Zimbardo, 2006). Although heroes are rare, they exemplify human excellence and deserve empirical attention to understand their development.
Humanistic psychology focuses on the breadth and depth of all human
experience to understand humans themselves (Schneider, Pierson, & Bugental, 2014); and we are particularly interested in the experience of humanities heroes. This article begins to examine the ways in which people
who act heroically are primed to take that action as a result of their personal history. In looking closely at a variety of people who have acted heroically, in a single moment or over time, we argue they have at least four
crucial commonalities: They imagined situations where help was needed
and considered how they would act; they had an expansive sense of empathy, not simply with those who might be considered “like them” but also
those who might be thought of as “other” in some decisive respect; they regularly took action to help people, often in small ways; and they had some
experience or skill that made them confident about undertaking the heroic
action in question.
Heroes are valued across cultures and throughout history (Becker & Eagly, 2004; Kohen, 2014). Suppositions about heroes and other exemplars’
motivation, responsibility, love, and choice have been primary concerns of
humanists and psychologists since the days of Socrates and Plato (Schneider
et al., 2014). Yet surprisingly, little research focuses on understanding the
development of heroes. Although the literature is sparse, there are studies
comparing the traits of heroes to more typical individuals, and investigating laypersons’ views of heroes (Franco et al., 2011; Midlarsky, Fagin Jones,
& Corley, 2005). There is also a growing understanding that not all heroes
are the same (Kohen, 2014; Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010). We define a
hero as a person who knowingly, and voluntarily, acts for the good of one
or more people at significant risk to the self, without being motivated by
reward (Zimbardo, 2007). Risk to the hero makes heroism a distinct form
of altruism (Franco et al., 2011).

Expansive Empathy
For Richard Rorty (1989, p. 191), solidarity and sympathy are directly resultant from personal identifications. When those who are suffering “are
thought of as ‘one of us,’ where ‘us’ means something smaller and more
local than the human race,” the sense of solidarity with them is strongest.
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Indeed, he suggests that human rights promotion is best served by “[concentrating] our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental education. That sort of education gets people of different kinds sufficiently
well acquainted with one another that they are less tempted to think of
those different from themselves as only quasi-human” (Rorty, 1998, p.
176). Pushing the example of the Holocaust further, Rorty (1989, p. 190191) notes:
Did they [non-Jewish Danes and Italians] say, about their Jewish neighbors, that they deserved to be saved because they were fellow human
beings? Perhaps sometimes they did, but surely they would usually, if
queried, have used more parochial terms to explain why they were taking risks to protect a given Jew— for example, that this particular Jew
was a fellow Milanese, or a fellow Jutlander, or a fellow member of the
same union or profession, or a fellow bocce player, or a fellow parent
of small children.

Rorty insists that victims of persecution, rather than making an appeal
to our common humanity, have traditionally been better served by appealing to a more powerful, more immediate, commonality.
In agreement with Rorty on this point is William F. Schulz, former Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, whose argument lines up
very closely with Rorty’s. After detailing human rights abuses in Nigeria,
Afghanistan, and El Salvador, he notes,
I am stricken at heart because I have the imagination to know at least
in proximate form what the experience, the pain, must have felt like. I
am stricken at heart because on some level I identify with the victims;
I know what it is to bleed. Although I have never been bitten by a horde
of red ants or had a thumb amputated or been crushed by a wall, I have
enough acquaintance with human suffering, either my own or that of
those I love, that my memory of that acquaintance stokes my recognition (Schulz, 2002, p. 23).

Not everyone, however, finds Rorty’s hypothesis compelling. Norman
Geras (1995, p. 11) is surprised by
how abstract . . . how obviously speculative, Rorty’s thesis about the
rescuers is. “Perhaps,” he suggests, they occasionally said something
like this; but “surely” they more often said something like that. These
rescuers were real people and there is a body of writing about them.

In a sense, though, Geras misses Rorty’s ultimate point. Rorty’s goal is not
necessarily to create more rescuers but to instead expand everyone’s sense
of solidarity in order to prevent the human rights violations that require
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heroic behavior. This is what Rorty (1998, p. 181), following Annette Baier,
refers to as a “progress of sentiments.”
How has this progress of sentiments occurred and what might we do
to extend its reach? On this point, Rorty (1989, p. 196) offers us a great
deal, both in terms of his own theory and also in terms of our research on
heroism:
The right way to take the slogan “We have obligations to human beings
simply as such” is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to
expand our sense of ‘us’ as far as we can. That slogan urges us to extrapolate further in the direction set by certain events in the past—the
inclusion among “us” of the family in the next cave, then of the tribe
across the river, then of the tribal confederation beyond the mountains,
then of the unbelievers beyond the seas (and, perhaps last of all, of the
menials who, all this time, have been doing our dirty work). This is a
process which we should try to keep going. We should stay on the lookout for marginalized people—people who we still instinctively think of
as “they” rather than “us.” We should try to notice our similarities with
them. The right way to construe the slogan is as urging us to create a
more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have.

Most important to note is Rorty’s (1998) notion that our sense of who
“we” are can be continually expanded to include more and more people
based on similarities that are not found so much as they are created by
telling
the sort of long, sad, sentimental story that begins, “Because this is what
it is like to be in her situation—to be far from home, among strangers,”
or “Because she might become your daughter-in-law,” or “Because her
mother would grieve for her.” (p. 185)

Telling these sorts of stories, he argues, is the most practical method for
increasing our sense of solidarity with those we once considered “others.”
By way of example, consider the case of Carl Wilkens, an Adventist
missionary and the only American to remain in Rwanda during the 1994
genocide. When the genocide began, the U.S. government closed its embassy in Kigali and evacuated citizens who were residing all across the
country. Wilkens, however, made the decision to send his family home
and to remain in Rwanda (see Barker, 2004). In doing so, he put himself
directly in harm’s way, not only because of the ongoing warfare between
the Hutu Power government and Tutsi-led rebels but because he sheltered
Tutsi refugees from the interahamwe militia and worked to assist others
who were in hiding. When asked why he chose to act as he did, Wilkens’s
response is telling:
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For a while, when people would ask me why [I] chose to stay, I would
try to go into some detail [about] that Tutsi young lady and that Tutsi
young man [who worked for me]. [They] were [the] faces [of the victims of the genocide], representing the country and I felt if I left, they
were going to be killed. . . . The first three weeks, I never left my house,
and I was wondering, why did I stay? What am I doing? [Then I realized] the two people in my house [were] still alive, and I [was] very
grateful for that. (Barker, 2004)

That his heroic rescue of Tutsi began with those who were closest to
him is no surprise, but what is noteworthy is that he need not have identified with them in the way that he did, given that so many others (Hutus,
Americans, other foreign nationals in Rwanda and abroad) did not. Doing
so, recognizing that these potential victims were like him in some important respect, allowed him to expand the circle of care that is so important
to heroic behavior (Kohen, 2010).
Empathy has always been highly correlated with heroic and altruistic
actors (Fagin-Jones & Midlarsky, 2007; Harvey, Erdos, & Turnbull, 2009;
Jayawickreme & Di Stefano, 2012; Midlarsky et al., 2005; Osswald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2004, 2010). And while some researchers such as
Oliner and Oliner (1989) conclude that heroes act because of an expanded
sense of empathy, other psychological research on empathy and prosocial behavior seems to support Rorty’s point. Empathy is an affective response that comes from taking the perspective of another while sharing
the same or similar emotions. The emotional component develops incredibly early in children, essentially from birth (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad,
2006), then as children’s cognitive abilities advance they gain perspective taking skills and are able to empathize to stories, by mid childhood
they can empathize with another person’s specific struggles, and adolescents are able to both feel and take the perspectives of entire groups, such
as the poor (Eisenberg et al., 2006). Interestingly, recent research on the
neural circuitry of empathy suggests that empathy for similar others “is
neutrally distinct from empathy for humankind, more generally (Mathur,
Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010, p. 1474).” The affective response is experienced broadly in response to any suffering other, but the cognitive component of empathy, perspective taking, may be activated only when observing the suffering of similar others (Mathur et al., 2010). Additionally,
Mathur et al. (2010) determined the cognitive process, not affective, must
be in place for altruistic motivation.
Clearly, the ability to take the perspective of others is directly tied to
Rorty’s argument. Furthermore, many programs seeking to foster empathy
seem to operate on the assumption that it is easier to take the perspective of
someone similar to you, than more dissimilar (Belman & Flanagan, 2010).

C u l t i vat i n g E m p at h y, A l t r u i s m , a n d H e r o i c I m a g i n at i o n

7

One of the most common ways to foster empathy is to encourage a participant to take the perspective of a similar, rather than dissimilar, other. This
is used often to foster empathy in medical professionals, for conflict resolution, and in school antibullying programs (Belman & Flanagan, 2010).
These programs have varying levels of success but one clear example is an
empathy focused method of rape prevention given to male student athletes
and fraternity members where they watched a video describing the rape of
a man, by two other men (Foubert & Perry, 2007). Participants made clear
connections between the feelings they had while watching it, and the feelings a woman would have in similar situations (Foubert & Perry, 2007).
While the act of refraining from rape is clearly not heroic, this example
demonstrates that it was easier to take the perspective of similar others,
than more dissimilar others. In short, empathy was easier when the participants saw immediate commonalities with the victims; this pattern has been
seen in heroes as well. When comparing rescuers during the Holocaust to
bystanders, Fagin-Jones and Midlarsky (2007) found evidence that heroes
who had experienced persecution themselves were more likely to help because they were more likely to empathize with the victims. However, they
also found that bystanders had more previous experience with Jews than
the heroic rescuers (Fagin-Jones & Midlarsky, 2007).
Another rationale for how this expanded empathy arises comes from the
self-expansion model of motivation. Aron, Norman, and Aron (1998) describe that as people develop relationships, their self expands and begins
to include the other. A clear example of this is a partner in a relationship
who takes on the perspectives of their companion. In essence their self has
expanded and the other is now included as an overlapping part of the self.
However, this process does not need to involve a close relationship, it can
involve strangers. Specifically, the cognitive component of empathy involves
a person putting themselves in the shoes of the other, this acts as a means
of including the other in the self (Aron et al., 1998). Aron argues that when
a person sees someone in need, empathy is activated and the process of taking that person’s perspective makes them more self-like, expanding the self
to include that other (Aron et al., 1998). Furthermore, this inclusion of another person in the self enhances empathy and altruism (Aron et al., 2004).
The conclusion is that while it’s likely not all heroes acted out of empathy born of direct commonality, many likely did, and in any case it is clear
that working to see “others” as similar to “us” is one effective way to develop empathy. We hypothesize that most heroes expanded their empathy
to include the people they helped; additionally, we predict that working to
expand empathy could be an effective way to increase prosocial and even
heroic behavior.
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Heroic Imagination
In addition, and very much related to this expansive sense of empathy,
is the development of what we call the heroic imagination, by which we
mean that, prior to their heroic actions, heroes imagined situations where
help was needed and considered how they would act. This has been a primary focus of Zeno Franco and Phil Zimbardo since the writing of their
first article in Greater Good (2006) and in The Lucifer Effect (2007). They
proposed an intervention where they would foster the “heroic imagination, or the development of a personal heroic ideal. This heroic ideal can
help guide a person’s behavior is times of trouble or moral uncertainty”
(Franco & Zimbardo, 2006, p. 31). While there is currently a dearth of
empirical evidence in support of these interventions, there are dramatic
anecdotal examples of participants who attended the Hero Round Table,
or participated in the Heroic Imagination Project interventions, who did
find themselves in situations requiring heroism and acted heroically (Hero
Round Table, 2016).
Christopher Norman provides a noteworthy example. He was a passenger on a high speed train from Amsterdam to Paris at the end of August in
2015. A heavily armed man came into his cabin with the clear intent to cause
harm. Norman’s first reaction was to hide. He ducked to the floor and hoped
he would survive. His reaction turned into considered action as he decided
he needed to do something rather than remaining passive and almost certainly dying. As a regular traveler, Norman had thought about this kind of
situation before. He had played out scenarios in his head, considering his
possible actions. He had also talked about these possibilities before. A couple of weeks before the incident on the train, he had spoken to a friend in
law enforcement about his options. His conclusion was that action was the
only option. It is no surprise that he took action on the day of the attack.
Two years after, Wesley Autrey famously saved a man’s life by laying on
top of him between the subway tracks, Chad Lindsey found himself unexpectedly recalling the story. Lindsey was on the platform waiting for his
train, when a man fell onto the tracks. He leapt onto the tracks and tried to
lift the unconscious, bleeding man onto the platform. He had difficulty doing
so and saw the tunnel starting to get lighter. Recalling Autrey’s feat, Lindsey
decided not to repeat it. He told The New York Times (Wilson, 2009), “I was
like, ‘I am not doing that. We’ve got to get out of here.’” He called for help
and bystanders turned into active helpers, pulling the man onto the tracks.
In an e-mail to the authors Lindsey said, “I don’t think I had consciously
absorbed Autrey’s lessons for ACTUAL USE . . . but when I was confronted
with the situation, it seems I had instant access to those memories—what
to do, where to lie in the track-bed had it come to that, how horrendous it
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would be for the rolling stock to pass over you.” He also pointed out that as
a Michigander living in New York he had “curiosity about the transit system in general led me to have a fuller knowledge of the moving parts even
before I ever imagined I’d need them” (C. Lindsey, personal communication, March 21, 2016).
There are also examples of heroes in the literature like Oscar Romero
and Andree de Jongh. Romero was an Archbishop who was assassinated for
sermons and activism in support, defense, and liberation of the poor in San
Salvador (Brockman, 1989; Bronk & Riches, 2016). He clearly considered
how he would act in times of trouble or moral uncertainty because he became more active after his mentor Rutilio Grande was assassinated for the
same thing (Brockman, 1989; Bronk & Riches, 2016). While growing up in
Belgium, Andree de Jongh, wanted to be like her hero, Edith Cavell. Cavell
had been executed for helping captured British soldiers escape captivity during World War I. De Jongh followed in Cavell’s footsteps, becoming a nurse
before World War II. When the war started, she signed up to volunteer for
the Red Cross. Within a year, De Jongh had set up the Comet Line; a series of safe houses and escape routes from Brussels to Bilbao, Spain. Both
Romero and De Jongh are also great examples of the habitual helper, as discussed below. There are a great many of these stories, but it is also clear
that there is not as much research on the heroic imagination as there is on
empathy in heroes. Even so, there are empirical connections we can make.
Mental practice, or imagining, has been successfully used in sports psychology to improve specific skills, and in counseling situations to practice
interpersonal interactions (Cooper, Tindall-Ford, Chandler, & Sweller, 2001;
Kendall, Hrycaiko, Martin, & Kendall, 1990). Even when a specific skill is not
practiced explicitly imagery rehearsal, or imagining, is effective at improving specific sports skills (Kendall et al., 1990), which is relevant to the heroic imagination because it may be impossible or unwise to explicitly practice many heroism scenarios. Cooper et al. (2001) also found that imagining
is an effective way to improve performance for someone who has experience with a subject or context, but imagining is not effective for a novice
who has little or no experience with that subject or context. The effect is
even more pronounced when self-talk or self-explanation is included along
with imagining (Cooper et al., 2001). This is directly related to the special
training and experience of many heroes we discuss in more detail below.
Imagining acting heroically in contexts and with skills familiar to a person
will be more effective than imagining a heroic act in contexts the subject
has no knowledge of.
The heroic imagination may also be related to prospection. Prospection
is the process of mentally running through hypothetical future situations,
evaluating prospective behaviors, and selecting an action based on needs
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and goals (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013). One example of
prospection that most people are familiar with is imagining a difficult conversation with a friend, a person might predict the responses their friend
could give, and prepare rebuttals for potential responses (Seligman et al.,
2013). While much of prospection happens automatically and implicitly, it
can be performed deliberately, and the deliberate practice of imagining oneself in heroic situations may serve as a form of prospection. Prospection
helps drive goals and motivate behavior (Seligman et al., 2013), and may
also help a person clarify their self-concept, in this way engaging the heroic
imagination may help a person see themselves as a potential hero. We also
predict that this heroic imagination will be more effective when the imagined contexts are familiar, in a similar area as the special training the prospective hero has special training in. We encourage more work on the heroic imaginations affect the development of heroes.

Special Training
Very much related to the idea of imagining oneself taking heroic action is
the notion of developing a skill that is ultimately translatable to heroic action. In other words, it is all well and good to consider how I might respond
to an emergency, but it is also obviously beneficial to actually possess some
experience or skill that makes me confident about undertaking the heroic
action in question. The problem of the rescuing the hypothetical drowning
child is a familiar one to most people and Peter Singer (1972) sums up the
ethical requirements of a passerby succinctly: “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (p. 231).2 But a requirement for acting on behalf of the drowning child, most people believe,
is some baseline ability to swim. It would be heroic for anyone to attempt
to rescue a drowning child, but the chances of success are obviously much
greater for someone with lifeguard training. We want to go a step farther
and argue that it is more likely for someone who regards herself as a strong
swimmer to attempt a rescue than it would be for someone who does not
know how to swim; the former, even without lifeguard training, is more
likely to jump into the water while the latter would be more likely to remain a bystander (and advisedly so).3
Three Americans were also involved in effort with Christopher Norman
to prevent a massacre on the train in Europe. Anthony Sadler, Spencer
Stone, and Alek Skarlatos ran at the man with very little hesitation and took
much of the credit in stopping the attack. Each of them had military training. While this training is unlikely to have specifically prepared them to
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take down an armed man on a train, they undoubtedly had practiced combat during training and perhaps had engaged in combat during their service.
In 2015, a member of Parkour Generations UK walked into the Green
Park Underground station and saw a commotion at the end of the platform. A man had fallen onto the tracks and was unable to help himself back
up. Numerous people were debating what to do. The Parkour practitioner
dropped his backpack, jumped onto the tracks, and lifted the man back up.
His reaction was without thought about the practicalities of the procedure.
As someone who tested his body’s capabilities and limits on a daily basis
through Parkour, he knew he would be able to lift the man up, and how he
would do it. In an e-mail to the authors, the rescuer said there “wasn’t any
thought process” nor any doubt (Anonymous Hero, personal communication, March 22, 2016).
With regard to specific evidence from the field of psychology. A few studies have found that the bystander effect is weaker, or does not occur, for
people with domain specific training, or training to recognize the bystander
effect itself (Fischer et al., 2011). Of our four proposed commonalities, this
may be the area in need of the most scientific research.

Habitual Helpers
We argue that the final predictor of heroic behavior is repetitive action on
behalf of others. These actions, often small-scale, serve as a building block
of heroism insofar as they prime the prospective hero to take action when
the need arises. It has been said the best predictor of future behavior is past
behavior. While the pattern of helping in the development of heroes has not
been examined in depth, there are quite a few studies that find many heroes
are people who are habitual helpers. In fact, many studies of heroes find
participants through organizations that award long-term commitment in
providing prosocial service to others (see Becker & Eagly, 2004; Walker et
al., 2010; Walker & Frimer, 2007). We see more direct evidence of habitual
helping leading to more helping behavior in the research on prosocial development. Participation in prosocial activities seems to foster prosocial behavior later in life (Eisenberg et al., 2006). Like the foot in the door, small
commitments early in life lead to larger future commitments. One example
is organized youth activities and nonvoluntary service in school programs
is linked to future volunteering (Eisenberg et al., 2006). These prosocial
habits also increase empathy, social responsibility, adoption of prosocial
norms, opportunities to learn about new systems of meaning (e.g., about
social injustice or society), and may also lead to changes in self-concept
so habitual helpers begin to see themselves as helpful people (Eisenberg
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et al., 2006). Here again, Oscar Romero is an example of a hero who lived
his life in help to others. He made smaller commitments early in life such
as attending seminary, which deepened his purpose, and opened routes to
future prosocial behavior and heroism (Bronk & Riches, 2016). Interestingly, just as it did with Oscar Romero, this habitual helping may serve as
domain specific training.
Furthermore, along with values, social comparison, commitments, and
many other processes, these small habitual behaviors can help build a person’s identity. As a comparison, people with a moral identity developed
it, in part, by engaging in small acts of habitual helping through their life
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Walker & Frimer, 2007). People who have developed
a moral identity see themselves as centrally a moral being; being moral and
having moral values, principles and perspectives are central to their sense
of self (Berkowitz, 1997). This moral identity is partially created because
of habitual helping, and leads to further habitual helping as people with a
moral identity act in accordance with that identity across contexts (Hardy
& Carlo, 2011). While we do not expect all heroes to have a moral identity,
we hypothesize that many will, and many more will have gone through similar processes of incorporating their habitual helping in the development of
their identity as a potential hero.

Next Steps/Future Research
While heroism research is growing (see Allison, Goethals, & Kramer, 2016),
we lack understanding of how heroes develop. Leading developmental theories, such as relational developmental systems theory, suggest human development happens as a bidirectional interaction between individuals and
multiple contexts (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Lerner, 1991, 2006). Studies using
the developmental systems model are often person-centered and focus on
the processes that create change in the person and their contexts (Lerner,
1991, 2006). The four commonalities of hero development we have begun
to outline in this article easily fit this developmental framework.
Hero development may be similar to many moral exemplars: parent,
mentor, and peer examples helping foster empathy, prosocial behavior, altruism, and moral identity. Heroes may have developed skills or traits specific to their heroic actions. Heroes may have a habit of small-scale helping
that makes heroic action easier. Heroes may have developed a heroic imagination, imagining and considering how they would act in situations calling for heroism. Heroes may also have acted out of empathy due to direct
commonality or identification with victims. Heroes may develop this way,
but as yet we do not have much empirical data regarding the development
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of heroes beyond the anecdotal. We propose the field of heroism science examine the development of heroes from the lens of the developmental systems model.
It is not an easy task to study heroes and it will not be an easy task to
examine these four commonalities; however, we propose a few next steps
for this research. In-depth interviews with recognized heroes could help
jump start the process of understanding hero development, as would using any available archival data of awarded heroes to examine evidence of
these commonalities or suggest new ones. The field might also find use of
a scale of heroism or intended heroic behavior. At present, survey measures of civil courage or various personality assessments are all that are
available.

Conclusion
When confronted with a situation in which decisive, heroic behavior is required, most people do not act. What sort of person chooses to endanger
herself on behalf of another person, perhaps a stranger? What motivates
the hero to act when we know that so many others remain passive, bystanders? Getting to the root of heroic motivation, understanding why the hero
acts, why he is different from the crowd that stands back from the edge of
the subway platform, has the potential for great benefit for our society. In
considering four distinctions that characterize the hero, that separate him
or her from everyone else, we also point to ways in which everyone might
prepare themselves for a situation that calls for heroic action. This is in line
with a goal of humanistic psychology which has always “sought pathways
and technologies that assist human in reaching full humanness” (Moss,
2014, p. 3). While we argue that heroism is, in some very real sense, predetermined by a series of choices made long before the heroic action takes
place, we must point out that each of these characteristics can be inculcated
in any prospective hero. Heroism, in this way, relies on or requires a great
deal of priming or training. But it nonetheless remains something that is
accessible to anyone who is willing and able to prepare for it.
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Notes
1. Consider how much of the ongoing debate in the United States over gun violence, gun control, and so-called gun-free zones centers on the notion, proposed
by gun owners and advocates, that, so long as he is not prohibited by local ordinances or federal regulation, a “good guy with a gun” will always step up heroically to protect the endangered masses against an active shooter.
2. Singer (1972), of course, proceeds from this example to argue for a more expansive understanding of need and assistance: “It makes no difference whether
the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose
name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away” (pp. 231-232).
3. A powerful example from the world of professional athletics is Joe Delaney, a
Pro Bowl running back with the Kansas City Chiefs, who attempted to rescue
three drowning boys in a Monroe, Louisiana park on June 29, 1983. Though he
had never learned to swim, Delaney succeeded in saving one of the boys before
drowning in an attempt to save the two others. He was posthumously awarded
the Presidential Citizens Medal by Ronald Reagan (cf. Reilly, 2003).
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